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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
balancing is the only way to implement the protection for the free exer-
cise of religion afforded by the first amendment.
William W Pugh
DEFENDANT-WITNESSES, CONFESSIONS, AND A LIMITED SCOPE OF
CROSS-EXAMINATION
Appellant was indicted for first degree murder and, prior to trial,
moved to suppress a statement made to police.' An evidentiary hearing
on this 'motion was held at which appellant testified and was cross-ex-
amined on whether the statement was voluntary. The trial judge denied
the motion, finding the confession to have been voluntary, and the prose-
cution introduced evidence at trial to show that the confession was freely
given. 2 Appellant's motion to testify for the limited purpose of rebutting
the prosecution's evidence concerning the confession's voluntariness was
denied, and defendant appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court on that
question alone. In a prospective decision,3 the court held that in order to
enable a jury to determine the weight to be given a confession, an ac-
cused must be allowed to testify on the voluntariness and validity of the
confession, and may be cross-examined only on the issues of voluntari-
ness and credibility, including prior convictions. State v. Lovett, 345 So.
2d 1139 (La. 1977).
Louisiana criminal procedure entitles a defendant in a criminal
prosecution to a hearing outside the presence of the jury on the question
of the admissibility of his confession.4 This determination of admissibil-
I. It was appellant's contention that the statement given to the police was involuntary
because the police took at least one other unrecorded statement from him prior to giving
the Miranda warnings. Furthermore, appellant alleged that he was promised leniency if he
would cooperate by confessing and was threatened with physical harm. 345 So. 2d at 1144.
2. LA. CODE CRIUM. P. art. 703(B) requires the state to show at trial the circumstances
surrounding the making of a written confession or inculpatory statement where a ruling on
a motion to suppress is adverse to the defendant. This showing is to enable the jury to
determine the weight to be given the statement.
3. The court reached its decision on January 24, 1977, and applied it prospectively,
thus affirming appellant's conviction. On rehearing, however, appellant's conviction was
reversed. This reversal was in response to the complaint that the prospective nature of the
decision constituted dicta, which, said the court, was error in law. 345 So. 2d at 1144.
4. In Brown v. Mississippi 297 U.S. 278 (1936), the United States Supreme Court held
that the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution prohibits the use of an involun-
tary confession to convict a defendant in a state criminal proceeding. The minimum stan-
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ity may be made at a pre-trial hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, 5
if such a motion is filed, and must be made as a predicate to the intro-
duction of the confession as evidence at the trial on the merits.6 A de-
fendant may challenge the admissibility of his confession at trial
notwithstanding his failure to file a motion to suppress prior to trial.7
The prosecution has the burden of proving affirmatively and beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused's confession meets the statutory re-
quirements8 for admissibility.9 At this judge-hearing, the defendant is
not obliged to testify in order to prove the involuntariness of his confes-
sion, 10 but if he does testify, the prosecution's cross-examination is lim-
ited to that narrow issue, and such testimony cannot be used against him
at the subsequent trial before the jury." I The judge determines the volun-
tariness, and thus the admissibility, of the confession at this evidentiary
dard of admissibility held constitutionally binding in state courts was that the extraction of
defendant's confession not offend the fourteenth amendment standards of fundamental
fairness. 297 U.S. at 286. However, since Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a de-
fendant's in-custody statements may be inadmissible at trial despite their factually volun-
tary character if fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination have been abridged. The
Court imposed procedural safeguards upon law enforcement agencies to ensure the protec-
tion of these rights. As a result, in order for a competent waiver of these rights to occur, an
accused must be warned prior to custodial interrogation that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. Id. at 444. See also
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). These constitutional requirements are contained in
LA. R.S. 15:451 (1950), which provides: "Before what purposes [purports] to be a confes-
sion can be introduced in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that it was free and
voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats,
inducements, or promises." See also LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 703(B), 794, which provide
defendants with statutory protection similar but not identical to the federal jurisprudential
safeguards for the right against self-incrimination.
5. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 703(B).
6. LA. R.S. 15:451 (1950). See note 4, supra, for the text of this section. See also LA.
CODE CRIM. P. art. 794 which permits, and at the request of the prosecution or defendant
requires, the court to remove the jury from the courtroom when the court hears matters to
be decided by the court alone.
7. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 703(B).
8. LA. R.S. 15:451 (1950). See note 4, supra, for the text of this section.
9. State v. Simmons, 328 So. 2d 149 (La. 1976); State v. Sims, 310 So. 2d 587 (La.
1975); State v. Anderson, 254 La. 1107, 229 So. 2d 329 (1969).
10. State v. Bray, 292 So. 2d 697 (La. 1974).
11. State v. Sears, 298 So. 2d 814 (La. 1974). See also Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377, 389-94 (1968), articulating reasons for this procedure. The Court wished to re-
lieve a defendant from the dilemma of either testifying at such a hearing to assert his
constitutional rights and having his testimony admitted against him at trial as an admission





Although a ruling that a confession is admissible in a hearing on a
motion to suppress evidence is binding at the trial on the merits,' 3 a
defendant may introduce evidence during the trial concerning the cir-
cumstances surrounding the making of the confession for the purpose of
enabling the jury to assess the weight to be given to it. 14 Moreover, the
prosecution is required by statute to prove before the jury that the con-
fession was free and voluntary, 15 as a predicate to its introduction.
The permissible scope of cross-examination at trial before the jury
has traditionally been quite different from that at the prior judge-hear-
ing. When a defendant testifies at trial, he waives his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.' 6 However, prior to the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928, when an accused testified he could
only be cross-examined on those matters covered on direct examina-
tion.' 7 Since that time, the Louisiana Supreme Court has consistently
followed the superseding statutory authority 18 to permit cross-examina-
tion on the entire case.' 9 Thus, prior to Lovell, the defendant could not,
at the conclusion of the prosecution's predicate, testify for the limited
purpose of rebutting the evidence of the voluntariness of his confes-
12. The trial judge's decision that the confession was voluntary is a finding of fact that
will not be reversed on appeal unless it is without support in the evidence. State v.
Demourelle, 332 So. 2d 752 (La. 1976); State v. Whatley, 320 So. 2d 123 (La. 1975); State v.
Sims, 310 So. 2d 587 (La. 1975); State v. Cripps, 259 La. 403, 250 So. 2d 382 (1971). In a
habeas corpus proceeding, however, a federal district court has the power to hold an evi-
dentiary hearing and determine the facts notwithstanding a state court's findings. Faye v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
13. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 703(B).
14. Id See, e.g., State v. Demourelle, 332 So. 2d 752 (La. 1976).
15. LA. R.S. 15:451 (1950). See note 4, supra, for the text of this section. See also LA.
CODE CRIM. P. art. 703(B), which provides in part: "When a ruling on a motion to suppress
is adverse to the defendant, the State shall be required prior to presenting the written con-
fession or written inculpatory statement to the jury, to introduce evidence concerning the
circumstances surrounding the making of the written confession or written inculpatory
statement for the purpose of enabling the jury to determine the weight to be given it."
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person ... shall be compelledin any criminal case to
be a witness against himself .. " (Emphasis added).
17. La. Acts 1886, No. 29, § 2, provided: "[I]f the person accused avails himself of this
privilege [of testifying], he shall be subject to all the rules that apply to other witnesses, and
may be cross-examined as to all matters concerning which he gives his testimony . .. .
18. LA. R.S. 15:280 (Supp. 1966), 15:462 (1950). See note 24, infra, for the text of these
sections.
19. See, e.g., State v. Sears, 298 So. 2d 814 (La. 1974); State v. Cripps, 259 La. 403, 250
So. 2d 382 (1971).
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sion.20 In the 1975 case of State P. Whatley,2 1 however, the Supreme
Court hinted at its dissatisfaction with the prior jurisprudence by choos-
ing a narrow procedural ground-the absence of an objection to the pro-
cedure employed- to avoid deciding whether a defendant must be given
an opportunity before his confession is introduced to present evidence
against voluntariness, or whether he must wait until the presentation of
his own case to present such evidence. Lovett, by allowing the defendant
himself to testify before the jury contemporaneously with the prosecu-
tion's predicate, departs from the jurisprudence.
To reach its decision in the instant case, the court had to "reinter-
pret" the relevant state statutes22 in light of the constitutional rights of an
accused. The court first recognized that the legislative policy expressed in
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 703(B) is to allow the jury
to determine the weight to be given a confession, notwithstanding its ad-
missibility. This is accomplished by requiring the prosecution to prove
affirmatively that the confession was free and voluntary as a predicate to
its introduction as evidence. The defendant's traditional dilemma,
wherein he often cannot refute this evidence without completely sacrific-
ing his self-incrimination rights, was an important factor in the court's
reasoning.
The court was at pains to reconcile the interpretation offered by the
defendant 23 with the language in Louisiana Revised Statutes title 15, sec-
tions 280 and 462,24 because both sections explicitly provide that a de-
20. See, e.g., State v. Sears, 298 So. 2d 814 (La. 1974); State v. Cripps, 259 La. 403, 250
So. 2d 382 (1971); State v. Goins, 232 La. 238, 94 So. 2d 244 (1957).
21. 320 So. 2d 123 (La. 1975).
22. LA. R.S. 15:280 (Supp. 1966), 15:451 (1950), 15:462 (1950); LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts.
703(B), 794. See note 24, infra, for the text of LA. R.S. 15:280, 462.
23. "The defendant strenuously urges that, unless he is permitted to take the stand to
refute the state's evidence of voluntariness, there is no practical way by which his conten-
tion of involuntariness may properly be considered by the jury in its determination of the
weight to be given the confession. Thus, he contends, the legislative policy of letting the
jury dtermine the weight to be given an allegedly involuntary confession, and an accused's
right against self-incrimination, cannot both be effectuated unless an accused is permitted
to take the stand (preferably contemporaneously with the state's predicate) to dispute the
state's evidence of voluntariness, without at the same time subjecting himself to cross-ex-
amination except as to the issue of the confession and as to his credibility." 345 So. 2d at
1141.
24. LA. R.S. 15:280 (Supp. 1966) reads: "When a witness has been intentionally sworn
and has testified to any single fact in his examination in chief, he may be cross-examined
upon the whole case." (Emphasis added). Likewise, LA. R.S.15:462 (1950) says: "When a
person accused, or a husband or wife becomes a witness, such witness shall be subject to all




fendant can be cross-examined on the whole case once he voluntarily
testifies on direct examination. 25 In its new interpretation of these stat-
utes, the court concluded that a defendant does not waive his right
against self-incrimination, and is therefore not subject to cross-examina-
tion upon the whole case, unless he takes the stand aspart of his defense
on the merits.26 This implies that a rebuttal by a defendant-witness con-
cerning the voluntariness of the confession at the conclusion of the pros-
ecution's predicate is not a defense on the merits, but is merely a
compliance with the legislative policy of allowing the jury to determine
the weight to be given the confession.
The court found support for this determination in the history and
rules concerning the prior law regulating the scope of cross-examination
of a defendant 27 and the evidentiary hearing at trial or on a motion to
suppress. The principles applicable to this hearing, said the court, "result
in a judicial balancing of the necessity for a statutory predicate of admis-
sibility in order to effectuate constitutional rights, against the equal ne-
cessity not to infringe upon an accused's constitutional right against self-
incrimination. '28 Even though the court conceded that evidence con-
cerning a confession is admitted at trial for a different purpose, 29 it none-
theless applied the principles controlling the evidentiary hearing to the
trial and found that the same rules should apply to both. Therefore, as in
the case of the evidentiary hearing, an accused who testifies at the con-
clusion of the prosecution's predicate can only be cross-examined on the
issue raised therein, the voluntariness of the confession. The Lovett court
preferred this statutory construction, and overruled contrary jurispru-
25. See note 24, supra.
26. The court cites State v. Rhodes, 337 So. 2d 207 (La. 1976) and State P. Pellerin, 286
So. 2d 639 (La. 1973), among other cases, as authority for this proposition. 345 So. 2d at
1141-42. In Rhodes, the court noted: "Whatever the merit of the claim that a defendant
testifying on his own behalf may not be cross-examined on totally irrelevant matters if an
answer requires him to incriminate himself, a defendant who chooses to waive his fifth
amendment privilege by testifying may certainly be required to answer possibly incriminat-
ing questions pertinent to the case under consideration, if relevant. He may be cross-ex-
amined on the whole case." 337 So. 2d at 209. (Emphasis added). The court in Pellerin
stated, "However, here where the defendant has taken the stand before the jury at the trial
on the question ofguilt or innocence, he is subject to all the rules that apply to other wit-
nesses, including comment upon his testimony and the reasonable and fair conclusions to
be drawn therefrom." 286 So. 2d at 643. (Emphasis added).
27. 345 So. 2d at 1141; see note 17, supra.




dence,30 because the exercise of a statutory right to have the jury hear
evidence which may lessen the weight given to the confession 3 should
not be conditioned upon the waiver of the constitutional right against
self-incrimination.32
On first impression, Lovell appears to have broad implications for
future cases and the trial process itself. However, the decision's scope is
not so broad as it appears. First, it should be noted that Lovett does not
hold that all evidence concerning the involuntariness of a defendant's
confession must be presented contemporaneously with the prosecution's
predicate. Only the accused himself must be allowed to testify at this
point to avoid prejudicing his right against self-incrimination, 33 although
the court indicated in dictum that it preferred the broader procedure so
that the issue is segregated for presentation to the jury.34 Furthermore,
the court was unwilling to declare that the prior judicial interpretation
violated defendants' constitutional rights, and therefore decisions con-
trary to Lovett3 were not overruled retrospectively. Moreover, the for-
mulation of judge-made rules to protect the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination in another phase of the trial process is not so
radical in light of the institution of such rules in the pre-trial setting of
custodial arrests in Miranda v. Arizona.36 The judiciary has historically
emphasized the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination with the
rationale that government should bear the burden of convicting an ac-
cused through its own labor, rather than causing the defendant to in-
criminate himself.37 Therefore, when defense counsel argued that there
was no practical way to exercise the statutory right to put evidence
before the jury on the voluntariness of the confession without sacrificing
fifth amendment rights, 38 it is not surprising that the court accepted this
argument and extended the privilege against self-incrimination for a lim-
ited purpose within the trial.
Despite the apparent conflict between Lovett and the language of
sections 280 and 462,39 support for the decision can be found in these
30. State v. Sears, 298 So. 2d 814 (La. 1974); State v. Cripps, 259 La. 403, 250 So. 2d
382 (1971); State v. Goins, 232 La. 238, 94 So. 2d 244 (1957).
31. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 703(B).
32. 345 So. 2d at 1142.
33. Id. at 1143.
34. Id.
35. See cases cited in note 30, supra.
36. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
37. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235-38 (1940).
38. 345 So. 2d at 1141.
39. See the text of these sections in note 24, supra.
19781
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
statutes and the jurisprudence interpreting them. According to section
280, the scope of cross-examination is unlimited only when a witness
testifies on "any single fact in his examination in chief."'40 Thus, one
could arguably exclude the Lovett rebuttal from the scope of this statute
since it is not a part of the defense in chief, but is made contemporane-
ously with the prosecution's predicate, and goes only to the weight of the
confession. 4' Furthermore, section 462 provides that a defendant-witness
is subject to the rules applying to all other witnesses, and there is support
in the jurisprudence for an argument that a non-defendant witness who
testifies on one issue does not necessarily waive his right against self-
incrimination on unrelated matters.42 In limiting the waiver of the right
against self-incrimination to those matters covered on direct, Lovett is
therefore partially consistent with language in the jurisprudence inter-
preting the relevant statutes.
This rationale, however, involves an assumption that the voluntari-
ness issue is unrelated to other relevant issues within the case. The evi-
dentiary hearing determines the confession's admissibility and, therefore,
by definition, its voluntariness.43 However, when a defendant testifies at
trial and attempts to discredit a confession offered by the prosecution,
the issue is no longer admissibility. At this point, testimony goes to the
determination of guilt or innocence of the accused, although in the guise
of the jury's determining the weight to be given the confession. Thus, the
court's distinction between the weight to be given the confession and the
ultimate issue of guilt or innocence of the accused may not be justified,
since once a confession is admissible, its weight has a direct relationship
to the jury's ultimate verdict. A denial of the evidence presented by the
prosecution to show the statement's voluntary nature amounts to a de-
nial of the truth of that confession. Therefore, the Lovett rebuttal, for all
practical purposes, becomes a defense on the merits and the weight issue
merges with the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. As a matter of statu-
40. LA. R.S. 15:280 (Supp. 1966).
41. 345 So. 2d at 1141.
42. Id. at 1142, citing State v. Bolen, 338 So. 2d 97 (La. 1976), wherein a prosecution
witness was not compelled to answer defense counsel's questions on whether marijuana
had been smoked in a car in which witness and decedent-victim had been riding immedi-
ately prior to the accident for which defendant was tried, because compelling the witness to
answer this question would be a violation of his right against self-incrimination.
43. See State v. Gilmore, 332 So. 2d 256, 259 (La. 1976) ("Admissibility of a confes-
sion is to be determined by the trial judge, while the weight to be given to the confession is
a question for the jury. The conclusions of the trial judge on the voluntariness of the con-
fession to determine its admissibility, therefore, [are rulings on] a question of fact which
this court will not overturn unless . . . not supported by the evidence.").
[Vol. 38
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tory construction, this realization places the rationales supporting the de-
cision on a precarious assumption.
Although the court used statutory construction as the basis for its
holding,44 Lovett is clearly a policy oriented decision. For instance, the
court balanced the "necessity for a statutory predicate of admissibility in
order to effectuate constitutional rights, against the equal necessity not to
infringe upon an accused's constitutional right against self-incrimina-
tion" to find that the limitation upon cross-examination at the eviden-
tiary hearing should also apply at the conclusion of the prosecution's
predicate,45 though the court declined to hold that this limitation is man-
dated by constitutional law. 46 However, it should be noted that the evi-
dentiary hearing was established to avoid merging the legal question of
admissibility with the factual determination of guilt or innocence of the
accused. Since the only relevant inquiry at this hearing is the voluntari-
ness of the confession, cross-examination is necessarily limited to that
narrow issue. Limiting the scope of cross-examination at trial is irra-
tional unless the issues of guilt or innocence and the weight to be given
the confession can be separated.
Lovett may, however, be justified as a matter of constitutional law.
At least one authority47 has stated that Malloy v. Hogan,48 which made
the right against self-incrimination applicable to the states, 49 also may
oblige the states to follow the narrow rule of cross-examination rather
than Louisiana's wide-open rule. The narrow rule, employed by federal
courts, limits cross-examination to matters covered on direct. In a sense,
Lovett appears to be a tacit adoption of the narrow rule in cases where a
confession will be introduced because it allows a defendant to take the
stand on the limited issue of voluntariness. From the defendant's per-
spective, this interpretation would be preferable to an extension of his
right against self-incrimination because it would avoid the prejudicial
effect of the defendant's having to invoke his privilege in response to a
potentially incriminating question by prohibiting the question itself.50
44. 345 So. 2d at 1142-43.
45. Id at 1142.
46. Id. at 1143.
47. The Work ofthe Louisiana Appellate Courtsfor the 1970-1971 Term- Epidence, 32
LA. L. REv. 346 (1972).
48. 378 U.S. 1 (1963).
49. Id. at 10-11: "[O1n applying the [fifth amendment] privilege, the same standards
determine whether or not an accused's silence is justified, be it in State or Federal Court."
50. The privilege against self-incrimination excludes the response to judicial inquiry,
regardless of probative value. See, e.g., Wood v. United States, 75 App. D.C. 274, 128 F.2d
265 (1942). Before a judge can determine whether an answer will incriminate a witness, the
1978]
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The procedure used to implement the Lovett protection has not yet
developed, and the decision leaves several unanswered questions. Al-
though the judge's determination of admissibility at the evidentiary
hearing previously was binding at the trial, the language employed by
the court in its holding raises the issue of whether the jury is now entitled
to decide the legal question of admissibility. Under the Lovett rule, an
accused is permitted to take the stand for "the limited purpose of testify-
ing as to the voluntariness and validity of the confession sought to be
introduced."'51 However, the meaning of the term "validity" is unclear. If
the court used "validity" merely to restate "voluntariness" then the jury's
duty, to determine the credibility of the confession, is unchanged. How-
ever, if the court used that term in a strict, legal sense, then the jury may
have the duty to determine admissibility. In such a case, the defendant
should be entitled to an instruction charging the jury to disregard the
confession if it finds that it was given involuntarily. Although a similar
charge in a trial held without a prior evidentiary hearing was found
insufficient to protect a defendant's constitutional right to have an invol-
untary confession entirely disregarded,52 the added protection of an
independent determination of the coercion issue at the evidentiary hear-
ing will render such an instruction beneficial to the defendant by giving
him another chance to prove the confession was coerced, and therefore
invalid.
The ultimate effects of the Lovett decision remain to be seen. It
could signal a trend which may result in allowing a defendant, before his
confession is introduced as evidence, to present all his evidence against
its voluntariness, the issue the court was unwilling to decide in Whatley.
If not, Lovett may not be a significant decision. Since the court declined
to hold that constitutional rights were abridged by the procedure em-
ployed before the instant decision, 53 Lovett could be legislatively over-
ruled. Furthermore, the protected rebuttal may not be available to a
significant number of defendants, for only those defendants who plead
not guilty despite their confessions will be affected. The prosecution may
impeach the defendant who chooses to testify on the voluntariness issue,
question must first be asked. Sweeney v. Cregan, 89 Colo. 94, 299 P. 1058 (1931). A limita-
tion upon the scope of cross-examination, however, does not involve a privilege concerning
a response, but excludes the inquiry itself by denying a party the right to cross-examine,
thereby eliminating the prejudicial effect of having a jury hear a defendant invoke his
privilege after being asked a potentially incriminating question. See, e.g., Houghton v.
Jones, 68 U.S. 702 (1863).
51. 345 So. 2d at 1142-43 (emphasis added).
52. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
53. 345 So. 2d at 1143.
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even by using prior convictions.54 Moreover, the psychological advan-
tage of a defendant's testimony, now protected by a limited scope of
cross-examination, arises only with a defendant who is a good witness.
Thus the primary factors that contribute to the general reluctance for a
defendant to testify at trial remain, and the limitation upon the scope of
cross-examination applies only for a limited purpose, the denial of the
voluntariness of an already incriminating confession. In short, despite
the extended protection afforded defendants, prosecutors should not be
unduly constrained by the Lovett decision.
Stephen H Vogt
DELVING INTO THE DETAILS OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS:
THE NEW LOUISIANA RULE
Four recent Louisiana cases have held that a cross-examiner may
properly go into details of prior convictions being used for impeachment.
In the parent case, State v. Jackson,' the defendant was charged with
armed robbery. When the principal defense witness took the stand to
testify, he was cross-examined over objection on a prior conviction.
While asking questions about his conviction for armed robbery, the pros-
ecutor inquired into a rape which occurred during the course of the prior
robbery. The court overruled previous Louisiana jurisprudence2 and
held that cross-examination concerning the rape was proper to show the
details of the crime underlying the conviction as tending to establish the
"true nature" of the conviction. Following Jackson, a unanimous court
in State v. Elam3 found that the trial court had not committed reversible
error by permitting the prosecution to examine a defendant-witness on
the details of his prior convictions. These decisions were reaffirmed by a
sharply divided court in State v. Williams and in a later State v.
Jackson.5
One common method of impeaching a witness is by prior convic-
54. Id.
1. 307 So. 2d 604 (La. 1975) [referred to hereafter in text as "Jackson I"].
2. Id at 606.
3. 312 So. 2d 318 (La. 1975).
4. 339 So. 2d 728 (La. 1976).
5. 339 So. 2d 730 (La. 1976).
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